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A central goal in governing the interface of the economies of the United States
and European Community (EC) is to reconcile the objectives of protective social
regulation, on the one hand, and free competition facilitated through open trade
policies, on the other. These policies can be both complementary and conflicted.
This paper examines how these issues have been addressed bilaterally in a
number of economic sectors through mutual recognition agreements and a
hybrid form, the safe harbor principles on data privacy protection. The paper
provides an overview and analysis of the 1997 Mutual Recognition Agreement
and its six sectoral annexes, and the 2000 agreement on Safe Harbor Principles
(for data privacy protection). The paper assesses what spurred these agreements,
which actors participated in their negotiation, what constrains their
implementation (in terms of both political and market forces), and, ultimately,
what are the prospects and limits for their adoption in other areas. Although
neither of these agreements directly prescribe harmonization of U.S. and EC
laws or regulatory approaches, they have led to some de facto harmonization by
regulatory authorities and firms. The paper concludes that, overall, transatlantic
institutional adaptation has been slow (and often creeping), but where it has
occurred, it has been rather unidirectional, and will likely continue to be so.
Simply stated, the United States has made most of the changes, whether through
adoption of international standards that mirror EC ones, through delegation of
testing and certification responsibilities to private laboratories reflecting the
EC’s “global approach,” or through coordination and oversight of these
laboratories under a new U.S. national program analogous to those operating in
the EC for over a decade.3
I.  INTRODUCTION
1
By the late 1990s, the value of trade between the United States and European
Community (EC)
1 combined with sales of U.S. and EC affiliates in each other’s
markets had expanded to exceed $1.7 trillion.
2 With this rise in transatlantic
trade and investment, developments on one side of the Atlantic increasingly
affect citizens, business enterprises and interest groups on the other, and, in turn,
these groups’ demands on their respective government representatives. With
tariff rates at historic lows for most categories of goods, transatlantic trade
issues increasingly have become regulatory ones–that is, divergent regulatory
laws and procedures in themselves not only restrain trade, and thus transatlantic
competition, but they can do so in an asymmetrical discriminatory manner. A
central question facing national legislators, executives and administrative
officials is how to govern transatlantic economic interdependence while
maintaining social standards responsive to their respective constituencies’
demands.
The United States and EC increasingly face the difficult task of
reconciling the objectives of protective social regulation, on the one hand, and
free competition facilitated through open trade policies, on the other. Depending
on the context, these objectives can be complementary or in conflict. For
example, the goals of domestic regulatory and free trade policies are both to
protect and benefit citizen-consumers, in which sense they are complementary.
Social regulatory policies, at least in their ideal form, are to protect consumers
from the risk of market failures through state regulatory intervention. Open trade
policies, at least in their ideal form, intend to offer consumers a wider selection
of goods at lower prices, thereby expanding their consumption possibilities and
increasing their standard of living.
3
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Regulatory and trade policies, however, may conflict for two primary reasons.
First, domestic lawmakers and regulators typically do not take account of the
impact of domestic regulations on foreigners, primarily because foreigners do
not have a voice in domestic political and regulatory processes.
4 Even absent a
discriminatory intent, regulatory requirements can be duplicative, redundant or
otherwise disproportionately affect traded products, in part because domestic
regulators do not take account of these impacts.
5 In an economically
interdependent world, domestic politics thus generates both input discrimination
(from the lack of representation of foreigners in domestic political processes)
and output discrimination (from the greater burden of duplicative regulations on
cross-border traders).
Second, regulatory divergence reflects genuine difference in constituent
preferences, and there is no reason why these differences must be harmonized or
made compatible. Thus, the challenge confronting political leaders is to reduce
redundant regulatory barriers to trade, where possible, without sacrificing
democratic choice regarding the appropriate allocation of risks and the
appropriate procedures for addressing them.
6 The task is far from easy. To
attempt to meet this challenge, U.S. and EC political leaders, under the aegis of
the New Transatlantic Agenda,
7 have begun to devise structures for transatlantic
political and regulatory cooperation so that domestic regulatory processes are
more likely to reflexively take account of the impact of domestic regulatory
choices on non-constituents.
This Article provides an overview of how the tension between the goals
of domestic regulatory protection and liberalized trade have been addressed by
the United States and EC through transatlantic mutual recognition agreements
and a hybrid form, the U.S. - EC safe harbor principles on data privacy
protection. The Article assesses the prospects and limits, both politically and in
the marketplace, of the U.S. - EC Mutual Recognition Agreement (MRA) and its
six sectoral annexes (of 1997), the U.S. - EC Mutual Recognition Agreement on
Marine Safety (initialed in June 2001), and the U.S. - EC understanding on Safe
Harbor Principles for data privacy protection (of 2000). The analysis is based on
a review of relevant documentation coupled with interviews of U.S. and EC
representatives. The Article assesses what spurred these agreements, which
actors participated in their negotiation, what constrains their implementation,
and, ultimately, what are the prospects and limits for their adoption in other
areas.5
The Article advances four primary findings. First, transatlantic mutual
recognition agreements need to be seen in the context of domestic and global
business strategies to reduce regulatory compliance costs, to get new products
quickly to market in a changing technological environment and thereby to
enhance profits. Second, the agreements’ implementation has been much more
difficult than envisaged by business and government leaders on account of
reactions in the marketplace and wariness of independent regulatory officials,
particularly in the United States. Third, the agreements and understandings
nonetheless have spurred some domestic regulatory change, as well as some
mutual recognition of product approvals. They also could spur some de facto
harmonization of regulatory approval procedures and substantive standards,
thereby reducing the potential for intergovernmental conflict in these sectors.
Fourth, and perhaps most controversially, where there has been convergence, the
convergence has tended toward EC–and not U.S.–regulatory practices. As this
Article will show, the EC now has a sustained record under its single market
program of easing trade barriers among fifteen EC member states working in
eleven different languages, while retaining relatively high regulatory standards.
This practical experience, coupled with the EC’s growing market power, has
enabled EC regulators to put forward regulatory models that can be both
attractive to firms and more pragmatic to adopt than their U.S. counterparts.
II. HARMONIZATION AND MUTUAL RECOGNITION: CAN THE
EC’S “NEW” AND “GLOBAL” REGULATORY APPROACHES BE
APPLIED TO THE TRANSATLANTIC MARKETPLACE?
There exist three primary options for easing regulatory barriers for trading firms:
harmonization, mutual recognition and national treatment (albeit subject, of
course, to multiple variants).
8 Under a policy of harmonization, regulators in
separate jurisdictions agree to adopt identical substantive standards and
procedures.
9 Such harmonization facilitates cross-border trade as well as cross-
border regulatory cooperation because of regulators’ greater comfort with
similar standards. Under a policy of mutual recognition, regulators retain
separate standards for internally-produced products, but agree to recognize the
other jurisdiction’s standards for products imported from it, albeit sometimes
subject to significant conditions and controls.
10 Mutual recognition agreements
pose much greater challenges for regulatory cooperation because of regulators’
unfamiliarity and unease with divergent foreign standards. Under a policy of
national treatment, each jurisdiction maintains its own standards and is
proscribed only from applying more stringent standards to foreign products. A
national treatment regime removes fewer regulatory barriers, especially those
that are non-discriminatory on their face, since regulators are not required to6
“mutually recognize”  the other’s standards.
11 These three policy options can be
complementary, sometimes working in tandem.
A. Overview of the EC’s Coordination of National Regulatory Systems.
Since 1985, the EC has adopted what it terms “new” and “global” approaches to
European regulation, under which EC institutions only legislate “essential
requirements,” delegate the determination of more-detailed standards to quasi-
public European standards organizations (the “new approach”), and then
coordinate quasi-public national certification bodies to certify products produced
in any one member state for sale throughout the EC market (the “global
approach”).
12
In 1985, the European Commission issued a bulletin that set forth its “new
approach” to harmonization in response to the market-distorting and market-
segregating impact of multiple national standards and the difficulty of
appropriately overcoming them at the EC level, especially in light of rapidly
changing technologies.
13 Under this “new approach,” the Council of Ministers
(the Council) enacts framework directives for technical standards covering
“essential requirements.” The 1987 Single European Act modified voting rules
for the enactment of EC internal market legislation to a “qualified majority” vote
(as opposed to unanimity), thereby eliminating member state veto rights in the
Council. This combination of qualified majority voting and the reduction of EC-
prescribed standards to “essential requirements,” together with the EC’s highly-
publicized push to “complete” an EC internal market by 1992, led to the
adoption of a series of EC harmonization directives.
14
Under this “new approach” to regulation, the Council delegates the task of
drawing up more-detailed standards to industrial standardization bodies
operating under the umbrella of three European standards organizations– CEN,
CENELEC and ETSI.
15 These European standards organizations are comprised
of national standards bodies that, in turn, include representatives from
government, industry and other social groups. The European standards bodies
vote on a simple majority basis (following a first round of voting),
16 facilitating
the adoption of “non-essential” technical standards. These standards are not
internally binding on the member states, so that member states retain some de
jure autonomy. However, these standards have become de facto harmonized
requirements for selling products within the EC on account of their importance
in the marketplace.
17
Under what is termed the EC’s “global approach” to regulation, products
may be tested and certified within any member state in order to receive a “CE”7
marking (which indicates that they comply with “Communite Europeen” norms).
All member states must recognize these certifications (i.e. mandatory mutual
recognition), such that certified products may circulate freely throughout the EC
market. In 1990, the member states formed the European Organization for
Testing and Certification (EOTC) to coordinate national bodies engaged in the
certification process and thereby help assure national authorities of the reliability
of tests conducted in other member states.
18 Each member state must approve
and is responsible for overseeing the certification bodies within its jurisdiction
and must notify the Commission’s Enterprise Directorate-General (DG) of its
approvals. These testing and certification laboratories consequently are referred
to as “notified bodies.”
19 Member state authorities periodically meet and
exchange information about the process’ operation through working groups and
committees created pursuant to the respective directives. They thereby attempt
to build and retain confidence in the system.
20 This EC system can be
characterized as governance by coordinated cross-border public-private
networks.
21
Even though the CE marking alone is required for customs purposes, the
trade names and trademarks of national notified bodies can remain advantageous
for marketing purposes within member states. National distributors and suppliers
sometimes prefer certification by national bodies within their own jurisdiction in
order to reduce the risk of marketing products certified by a foreign body.
22
Market barriers thus arise not only from government intervention and regulatory
distrust, but also from the perceptions of private actors in the market. In short,
the EC’s endeavors, while generally successful, have encountered setbacks,
stalemates and ongoing challenges, despite the EC’s deployment of considerable
institutional resources.
23
B. Harmonization and Mutual Recognition in the Transatlantic Context:
Can the EC System Be Exported?
While there has been little effort to harmonize standards on a purely transatlantic
basis, the United States and European member states have negotiated through
international fora. In turn, such international standards can facilitate the
negotiation of bilateral mutual recognition agreements because, where parties
operate under common standards and procedures, they more easily understand
and develop trust in each other’s regulatory practices. For example, the1997
U.S. - EC Mutual Recognition Agreement is based largely on the mutual
recognition of test results by “Conformity Assessment Bodies,”
24 which bodies,
in turn, are evaluated pursuant to international standards set forth in ISO/IEC
Guides. The international standard-setting bodies relevant to the sectors covered8
by transatlantic mutual recognition agreements include the International
Standards Organization (ISO) (for a broad range of standards); the International
Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) (for testing and certification standards);
Codex Alimentarius (for food-related standards)
25; the International Conference
on Harmonization (for pharmaceutical standards)
26; the Global Harmonization
Task Force (for medical device standards)
27; and the International Maritime
Organization (for marine safety standards).
28
The EC has tended to look more favorably toward international
harmonization efforts than the United States for two primary reasons. First, EC
member states and European standards organizations have more experience in
negotiating and implementing agreements with third parties in light of the EC’s
own internal market process.
29 Second, in international organizations where each
country has one vote, the EC’s fifteen member states can work collectively so
that, overall, they are more likely to promote EC-based standards in multilateral
fora. For example, two of the most widely known ISO standards, ISO 9000 and
ISO 14000 were developed initially within Europe.
30
Mutual recognition agreements, in contrast, have been negotiated not
internationally, but bilaterally or through regional fora. For example, the United
States and EC have or are in the process of negotiating mutual recognition
agreements under the auspices of APEC and CITEL, as well as with individual
countries, such as Canada, Australia, Japan, New Zealand and Israel.
31The EC
reports that it has concluded “six Mutual Recognition Agreements on
conformity assessment between the European Community and third countries
(which have) entered into force: on 1/12/98 with the United States, on 1/11/98
with Canada, on 1/1/99 with Australia and New Zealand, on 1/1/02 with Japan,
and on 1/5/00 with Israel in the Sector of Chemicals Good Laboratory Practices
(GLP).”  See  Mutual Recognition Agreements, (visited Feb. 26, 2002
http://europa.eu.int/comm/enterprise/international/indexb1.htm#intro). The EC’s
experience in harmonizing and coordinating fifteen national regulatory systems
offers a model to be considered, and possibly exported, to these other contexts,
including the transatlantic one. Yet, the EC’s own experience also highlights the
challenges that the United States and EC face in governing the interface of their
economies. As this Article will demonstrate, there is even more distrust between
regulators on either side of the Atlantic, there are greater challenges of political
legitimacy, and the marketplace imposes even more severe constraints on the
effective implementation of mutual recognition agreements in the transatlantic
context.9
III. THE 1997 U.S. - EC MUTUAL RECOGNITION AGREEMENT
A. What Gave Rise to the 1997 Mutual Recognition Agreement?
The issue of transatlantic standards became more important to firms engaged in
transatlantic trade for two primary reasons. First, as transatlantic tariff barriers
decreased, firms became more concerned with, what they termed, duplicative
regulatory compliance costs.
32 They pressed for their removal. This pressure
increased with rising transatlantic investment, since divergent U.S. and EC
standards and certification requirements most directly affect transatlantic
corporate groups, and these groups more easily coordinate lobbying on both
sides of the Atlantic. Subsidiaries of U.S. firms in the EC account for about one-
third of EC imports from the United States, while subsidiaries of EC firms in the
United States account for about 38% of U.S. imports from the EC.
33
Second, when the EC moved toward a single market, U.S. firms
challenged that the EC was erecting a “fortress Europe” in which member states
would use common “single market” standards and certification procedures to
prejudice U.S. competition.
34 U.S. firms feared that they would be
disadvantaged because, under the EC’s “global approach,” only notified bodies
located within the EC could test and certify products for marketing in the EC.
35
Prior to the “global approach,” U.S.-based laboratories acted as subcontractors
for the testing of products under member state standards, and firms feared that
this option might be foreclosed.
36
In response to these developments, U.S. and EC authorities began to
seriously address issues of regulatory coordination at the beginning of the 1990s.
In May 1989, US Secretary of Commerce Robert Mosbacher and Commission
Vice-President Martin Bangemann agreed to explore the possibility of
transatlantic mutual recognition agreements, as well as mechanisms to grant
U.S. firms greater access to EC standard-setting procedures.
37 In 1995, the
United States and EC signed the New Transatlantic Agenda and its attached
“Joint Action Plan” which contained a detailed list of items to address. At the
NTA’s annual summits, negotiators were soon in search of “deliverables.”
Large businesses on each side of the Atlantic, working under the auspices
of the Transatlantic Business Dialogue (TABD), promoted the concept of
mutual recognition agreements, hoping to provide “deliverables” that met
business needs.
38 Although the TABD’s formation was initiated by the U.S.
Department of Commerce and the European Commission in the fall of 1995,
TABD rapidly became a significant independent voice, identifying areas of
concern and coordinating pressure on officials to set time tables for the signature10
and implementation of mutual recognition agreements.
39 As Paula Stern, former
chair of the U.S. International Trade Commission and advisor to TABD, states,
“TABD quickly established the Trans-Atlantic Advisory Committee on
Standards, Certification and Regulatory Policy (TACS) to formulate
recommendations, organized on a sectoral basis, for the elimination of
regulatory barriers between the two economies.”
40
U.S. and EC officials announced the 1997 MRA with fanfare as a
“milestone” in U.S. - EC economic relations.
41 Secretary Richard Daley of the
U.S. Department of Commerce proclaimed that the MRA could save businesses
over $1 billion annually in unnecessary regulatory compliance costs.
42 The
Transatlantic Business Dialogue estimated that about half of $110 billion of U.S.
exports to Europe require some form of EC certification, which now could be
accomplished in the United States. Officials announced plans for subsequent
MRAs to cover an array of product and service sectors. The TABD estimated
that a framework agreement for services would have an even greater impact in
freeing up trade, affecting approximately $130 billion in transatlantic
commerce.
43 Yet, as will be seen, both transatlantic businesses and government
officials have become less enamored with mutual recognition agreements in
light of their experience with the 1997 agreement.
B. Transatlantic Business Practice before the 1997 MRA.
In order to understand the limited scope of the 1997 MRA, it is helpful to briefly
review how businesses often had their products certified before its negotiation,
and how many continue to operate. Still today, private testing bodies often test
products in the manufacturer’s place of production on one side of the Atlantic in
accordance with standards set on the other, and then have these test results
certified by an accredited body in the importing jurisdiction. The domestic
testing body operates under a sub-contracting arrangement with the responsible
certification body in the importing jurisdiction.
44 For example, for the European
market, laboratories in the United States can test U.S. products under EC
standards and provide the paperwork to a “notified body” in Europe, which
certifies them. In addition, large European notified bodies themselves have
invested in the United States to provide these testing services in an integrated
manner. Now that U.S. regulatory agencies increasingly recognize testing by
private laboratories, U.S. laboratories too have entered into sub-contracting
arrangements with European counterparts for product certification under U.S.
standards. Large U.S. laboratories similarly have invested in Europe, and in
some cases, themselves become EC notified bodies.
45 In consequence, the
sectoral annexes to the 1997 MRA, assessed below, do not represent a11
significant change for many businesses, but rather a slight extension of sub-
contracting practices that have already adapted to regulatory and commercial
developments. In fact, sub-contracting is specifically contemplated in some of
the MRA’s sectoral annexes, such as for telecommunications equipment, which
provide that Conformity Assessment Bodies in one jurisdiction may sub-
contract testing to laboratories in the other.
46
C. The 1997 MRA Negotiations.
U.S. - EC negotiators initially discussed negotiating mutual recognition
arrangements in eleven sectors, but ultimately whittled this down to the
following six: telecommunications equipment, electromagnetic compatibility,
electrical safety, recreational craft, medical devices, and pharmaceutical good
manufacturing practices. As with all trade negotiations, the EC and United
States were concerned that the final results either favor their export industries or
be “balanced.” The United States wished to conclude an agreement on
telecommunications equipment first, but the EC refused because it felt that U.S.
firms would benefit more if the agreement covered only this sector. The EC used
its political leverage by threatening not to sign any MRA involving
telecommunications equipment without inclusion of MRAs covering medical
devices and pharmaceutical good manufacturing practices.
The MRA negotiations required the involvement of multiple executive
agencies since the negotiations comprised an overall framework agreement and
six annexes covering the six separate sectors. The Office of the United States
Trade Representative and the Commission’s Trade Directorate-General (DG) led
the negotiations of the MRA framework agreement.
47 Each of the annexes,
however, was negotiated by the regulatory agency responsible for the sector
concerned. On the European side, this was a simpler process on account of the
centralization of the responsible agency officials within the Commission’s DG
Enterprise and these officials’ long experience with coordinating the twin goals
of regulatory protection and free trade within the single market. Because of this
dual role, DG Enterprise officials are, in some ways, more analogous to the U.S.
Department of Commerce than to independent U.S. regulatory agencies. On the
U.S. side, in contrast, separate independent federal agencies negotiated the
annexes. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) handled the
telecommunications and electromagnetic compatibility annexes; the
Occupational Health and Safety Administration (OSHA), a division of the
Department of Labor, negotiated the electrical safety annex; the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) negotiated the annexes for medical devices and
pharmaceutical good manufacturing practices; and the Coast Guard oversaw the12
recreational craft annex. These U.S. agencies traditionally have focused only on
protecting public health and safety, and thus were less receptive to arguments
concerning trade facilitation.
The involvement of both trade officials and regulatory officials resulted in
intra - U.S. agency conflicts, as well as transatlantic ones. Trade officials more
aggressively pushed for an agreement, and U.S. regulatory officials, in particular
the FDA and OSHA, were reticent about accepting foreign certification of safety
standards. Since these agencies are relatively independent compared to their EC
counterparts, they obstructed agreement where they believed that their
regulatory missions might be compromised. In the fall of 1996, negotiations
almost broke down over inclusion of the medical device and pharmaceutical
annexes.
48 Only Congress’ intervention, following intensive lobbying efforts by
private firms and the U.S. Department of Commerce, overcame FDA opposition
to their inclusion. In November 1997, Congress passed the FDA Modernization
Act, which specifically directed the FDA to “support the Office of the United
States Trade Representative, in consultation with the Secretary of Commerce, in
efforts to move toward the acceptance of mutual recognition agreements.”
49 The
Act specifically encouraged mutual recognition agreements “between the
European Union and the United States” in all product areas under FDA
competence.
50
As the former EC Trade Commissioner Sir Leon Brittan states,
“governments proved to be more eager than their agencies to cooperate.”
51
Ultimately, it was trade officials, spurred by business constituents, who drove
the negotiations. High-level trade officials in two coordinating bodies within the
NTA framework– the Senior Level Group and TEP Steering Group
52 –
identified goals, set deadlines and monitored progress. Nonetheless, the annexes
required U.S. regulatory agency approval, which created delays, resulting in
sharp and ongoing criticism from the Transatlantic Business Dialogue.
53
D. The 1997 Mutual Recognition Agreement.
The 1997 Mutual Recognition Agreement consists of a framework agreement
and six annexes respectively covering telecommunications equipment,
electromagnetic compatibility, electrical safety, recreational craft, medical
devices, and pharmaceutical good manufacturing practices.
54 Each of the
annexes is, in fact, a separate agreement for a separate sector covering defined
categories and lists of products.13
The 1997 MRA does not cover recognition of the adequacy or equivalency of
transatlantic standards, but is rather much less ambitious. First, the EC and
United States have not negotiated harmonized transatlantic standards for the
concerned sector.
55 Second, although each annex is unique, each of them only
addresses mutual recognition by certification bodies (called “Conformity
Assessment Bodies”) located in the exporting jurisdiction in accordance with the
importing party’s required standards and procedures. Since neither the United
States nor the EC relinquish sovereign control over the substance of their
standards, transatlantic trading firms still must meet the separate requirements of
the world’s two largest markets.
56 Third, even these assessment evaluations are
subject to varying pre-approval and post-approval conditions.
57 For example, in
the case of medical devices, the relevant agencies need not accept the tests from
foreign certification bodies if they find the reports deficient and delineate why,
thus reducing businesses’ incentives to use these bodies. In the case of
pharmaceutical good manufacturing practices, the tests are performed by
regulatory bodies, and not private laboratories, and again, the agency in the
importing jurisdiction may reject reports where it finds them deficient.
The MRA sets up a new transatlantic structure for overseeing its
implementation. First, the MRA creates a Joint Committee, which consists of
U.S. and EC trade officials who meet twice annually. Second, the annexes create
Joint Sectoral Committees to oversee the annexes’ implementation. One would
think that the Joint Sectoral Committees would be of greatest importance since
they consist of the actual regulatory authorities who must oversee the protection
of health and safety on each side of the Atlantic. However, members of the Joint
Sectoral Committees for electrical safety have interacted primarily to argue over
their interpretations of the United States’ obligations. The other Joint Sectoral
Committees interact primarily via teleconference and e-mail.
58
1.  Telecommunications and Electromagnetic Compatibility: Relatively Smooth
Regulatory Cooperation.
The telecommunications and electromagnetic compatibility annexes should be
viewed together because they both involve telecommunications equipment and
their inclusion was sought by the telecommunications industry. These annexes’
complementarity is reflected structurally, in that the parties have formed a “Joint
Sectoral Committee,” consisting of members of the U.S. Federal
Communications Commission and the EC’s DG Enterprise to monitor the
annexes’ implementation.
59 Under both annexes, the parties agree to recognize
test reports and conformity assessment certificates issued by Conformity
Assessment Bodies located in the exporting jurisdiction, “without any further14
conformity assessment.”
60 As with all of the annexes, however, assessments are
made in respect of the standards and in accordance with the procedures of the
importing jurisdiction.
The responsible authority within each exporting jurisdiction (U.S. or EC
member state) is to designate the Conformity Assessment Bodies located within
it.
61 These designations have been accomplished without controversy, unlike for
other MRA annexes. As of June 2001, the United States had designated twenty-
three Conformity Assessment Bodies for telecommunications equipment, and
forty-three for electromagnetic compatibility.
62 EC member states had
designated a similar number of Conformity Assessment Bodies for
electromagnetic equipment, but fewer for telecommunications equipment, in
light of the shift in the EC toward self-certification (as described below).
63
Both annexes are now operational and, compared to the other annexes,
their implementation has been relatively successful. However, the
telecommunications annex has become less important for U.S. firms than when
originally negotiated because, in 1998, the EC Council enacted a new directive
concerning telecommunications equipment pursuant to which manufacturers
now may self-certify that their equipment complies with EC requirements.
64
Under this directive, firms only need to consult with outside testing bodies.
These bodies must maintain a record for post-market surveillance purposes, but
they do not issue pre-market assessment certificates.
65 Similarly, in regards to
electromagnetic compatibility, firms must prepare files on which EC “competent
bodies” state “opinions,” but these bodies do not prepare assessment
certificates.
66 Thus, the benefits of the MRA itself are relatively small for U.S.
telecommunications firms, since the EC does not require any outside
certification.
67 The EC’s move to manufacturer self-certification is much more
dramatic for U.S. firms than the MRA itself, and U.S. firms now lobby U.S.
authorities to adopt the EC’s decentralized system. For EC authorities, however,
the two annexes relative success has been undermined by the United States’
failure (on account of OSHA) to implement the electrical safety annex, which, in
the EC’s view, is also necessary for EC telecommunications firms to gain freer
access to the U.S. market.
2.  Electrical Safety: Regulatory Tensions.
EC negotiators insisted that the MRA include an annex concerning electrical
safety standards because the EC market has long been relatively deregulated and
thus more open to U.S. products. In contrast, the U.S. system calls for regulatory
reviews and product approvals by OSHA, a division of the U.S. Department of15
Labor. EC authorities, acting on behalf of EC firms, desired to ease the
regulatory burden for EC imports into the U.S. market that required OSHA
approvals.
68 They hoped to do so by having OSHA recognize product testing
and certification, under OSHA standards, by Conformity Assessment Bodies
located in Europe. In addition, at least certain sectors of the telecommunications
industry, and in particular from the EC, desired an MRA that covered not only
all aspects of telecommunications product approvals, but also might lead to
adoption within the United States of a decentralized EC system. This annex has
not been fully implemented, however, because of disputes with OSHA over the
designation of European Conformity Assessment Bodies, as assessed below.
3.  Recreational Craft: A Simple Annex.
The recreational craft annex was the simplest to negotiate and implement. In the
United States, the applicable regulatory body, the U.S. Coast Guard, already
permitted firms to self-certify their products, so that there was no need for any
European conformity assessment bodies. In contrast, products must be certified
by a “notified body” within the EC,
69 so that European recognition of U.S.
Conformity Assessment Bodies could (at least in theory) reduce costs for U.S.
firms. Nonetheless, it was much easier to implement this annex for the reasons
assessed below.
70
4.  Medical Devices: Disappointment and Delay.
As noted earlier, the United States and EC agreed to include the annexes for
medical devices and pharmaceutical good manufacturing practices in the MRA
only after the EC, U.S. trade officials, business lobbyists and Congress placed
considerable pressure on a reticent FDA. Although the medical device annex
was eventually included, the FDA insisted that the annex’s coverage be more
limited, even though the parties only agreed to mutually recognize testing
reports and not each other’s standards. First, the medical device annex only
applies to less stringently regulated medical devices, subject to possible
expansion based on an FDA “pilot program.”
71 Second, designated Conformity
Assessment Bodies are not selected by an authority of the exporting country, but
rather by “joint assessment.”
72 Third, implementation of the Annex was made
subject to a three-year transition period (to have ended in December 2001),
during which the FDA organized a “joint confidence building program.”
However, in the fall of 2001, the parties agreed to extend this transition period
for a further two years.
73 This confidence-building program includes mandatory
seminars, workshops, joint training exercises and observed inspections,
requiring a considerable investment by applicant laboratories. Fourth, designated16
Conformity Assessment Bodies will not necessarily be permitted to perform all
tests contemplated by the MRA, but only those in which the regulatory authority
determines that they are competent.
74 Fifth, while the annex uses the
terminology of “Conformity Assessment Bodies,” domestic regulatory bodies
retain ultimate authority to recognize the testing results.
75 Thus, Conformity
Assessment Bodies provide testing and systems evaluation services for
regulatory authorities, but do not make definitive determinations for marketing
purposes. Sixth, regulators must create a transatlantic “alert system” and
exchange “post-market vigilance reports” as integral parts of the program.
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5.  Pharmaceutical Good Manufacturing Practices (GMPs): FDA Reticence.
The least ambitious and furthest from implementation of the six annexes is that
for Pharmaceutical Good Manufacturing Practices. “Good manufacturing
practices,” at least as defined by the EC, are those aspects “of quality assurance
which ensures that products are consistently produced and controlled to quality
standards.”
77
 The parties’ intention in the pharmaceutical GMPs annex, the only annex not to
rely on private Conformity Assessment Bodies,
78 is to permit regulatory
authorities on one side of the Atlantic to rely on regulatory authorities on the
other to conduct on-site visits of manufacturing facilities. After the inspection,
the foreign regulatory authority is to provide an inspection report regarding the
manufacturers’ compliance with good manufacturing practices.
79 These
inspection reports should “normally be endorsed by the authority of the
importing authority, except under specific and delineated circumstances” (article
12).
The pharmaceutical annex originally was, in large part, an agreement to
agree, since many of the key provisions required further drafting. Initially, the
parties could not even definitively agree on a definition of good manufacturing
practices, noting definitions from each of their legislative texts and adding that
“the US and EC have agreed to revisit this.” Similarly, the parties left open the
content of their programs “for assessing equivalence” (article 6), as well as the
content of the “information which must be present in inspection reports” (article
8). However, in each case, these issues apparently have been resolved, with the
parties agreeing to retain their own inspection forms listing the items that the
other party’s regulatory authority must evaluate and the information that it must
provide.
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The “cornerstone” of the pharmaceutical GMP annex is each parties’
determination of the equivalence of the regulatory system of the other party,
which they “aimed” to conclude by December (1), 2001.
81 The FDA, however,
refused to recognize the equivalence of all but two member state systems, and
thus the agreement was not implemented by the agreed date. The FDA faces a
much more burdensome task to implement the MRA than do its European
counterparts, who only need to adapt to one additional regulatory authority. In
FDA’s view, to determine equivalence, it must review not only multiple EC
directives and related EC documents, but also each member state’s
implementing legislation, regulatory structures and regulatory practices.
82 The
FDA requires that it engage in joint training and joint inspections with
regulatory officials in each member state before recognizing that state’s
“equivalence.” The FDA claims that Congress has failed to allocate sufficient
budgetary resources for the FDA to implement the 1997 mutual recognition
agreement in a manner that ensures U.S. public safety.
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6.  One-sided Implementation of the Annexes.
As of January 2002, only the three annexes of greatest initial interest to U.S.
negotiators were fully operational–those covering telecommunications
equipment, electromagnetic compatibility and recreational craft.
84 In contrast,
implementation of the annexes for electrical safety equipment, medical devices
and pharmaceutical good manufacturing practices remain in dispute. The
transitional period for the medical device annex was extended for two years. As
for the pharmaceutical annex, the FDA maintained that it was willing to
recognize the “equivalency” of two member state regulatory systems by the end
of the 2001 transition period, but it set no fixed date for reviewing the others.
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The EC, which must act on behalf of all fifteen member states, rejected this offer
because it would prejudice manufacturers in the other thirteen member states,
who would still be subject to duplicative EC and FDA inspections.
86
 The EC’s negotiation stance has been somewhat complicated by the transition
to a new U.S. administration and the fact that the U.S. executive has less control
over the FDA and OSHA, as noted further below. The Commission, displeased
that the unimplemented annexes are those that the EC initially imposed as
conditions for the 1997 MRA, is reviewing its options.
E. New MRA for Marine Equipment: Initialed June 2001: Broadest in
Scope.
On June 12, 2001, the United States and EC initialed an Agreement on Mutual
Recognition of Certificates of Conformity for Marine Equipment. Unlike the18
1997 Mutual Recognition Agreement and its six annexes, this new agreement
provides for mutual recognition of each parties’ standards and procedures as
“equivalent” for purposes of certifications issued by conformity assessment
bodies located in either parties’ territory (Articles 3 and 4).
87 Although the
initialed annex only covered five marine products, such as survival craft and
lifesaving gear, the parties plan to expand this list before they submit the
agreement for final adoption under their respective legislative and administrative
procedures.
88
Pre-existing harmonization of standards in this sector, agreed under the
auspices of the International Maritime Organization (IMO) in Geneva, made
possible the parties’ mutual recognition of the “equivalence” of each other’s
standards. This new mutual recognition agreement should be much easier to
implement because testing bodies will not be certifying under separate standards
and procedures and thus less training and information exchange is required.
Moreover, the parties agreed up-front to recognize each other’s existing
certification bodies so that no application procedures are required for
implementation (Article 6). Thus, while this agreement is relatively narrow in
product coverage, it is much broader in scope.
IV. THE 1997 MRA IN CONTEXT: MULTI-LEVEL BUSINESS
STRATEGIES, DIVERGENT REGULATORY CULTURES,
UNEXPECTED MARKET BARRIERS
A. The 1997 MRA in the Context of Domestic Business Strategies.
Bilateral regulatory cooperation cannot be viewed, outside of domestic and
global business strategies. At the domestic level, trading firms hope that the
MRA will promote domestic adoption of harmonized standards, on the one
hand, and deregulated certification requirements, on the other. Firms’ main
target has been U.S. independent regulatory authorities. They have had some
success. Since 1998, the FCC has instituted a new program pursuant to which
private testing laboratories may certify new telecommunications equipment,
whereas formerly only the FCC could do so.
89 With business’s encouragement,
the EC has moved even further in some sectors, permitting manufacturer self-
certification of most telecommunications equipment since 1998. Also since
1998, the FDA has instituted a program for private testing and certification of
large categories of medical devices, starting with a pilot program that it plans to
expand. As John Chai notes, U.S. manufacturers saw the EC system as a
friendlier one to launch new products and urged Congress and the FDA to adopt
many of its flexible features. Allegedly, some “U.S. manufacturers were moving
their capital, resources, and facilities to Europe” as a result.
90 In response to19
primarily domestic demands, the FDA Modernization Act expressly authorized
the FDA to rely on private testing bodies in its oversight of medical devices.
91
Although the original goal of the MRA annexes may have been to
facilitate transatlantic trade, firms simultaneously focused on the deregulation of
domestic product approvals.
92 For example, deregulation of product marketing
approvals is a core item on the Transatlantic Business Dialogues’ agenda.
TABD, in its 2001 Mid Year Report, called for a model “linked to a wider use of
Supplier’s Declaration of Conformity,” and stressed the need for transatlantic
adoption of the EC’s global approach under the motto: “Approved Once,
Accepted Everywhere.”
93 Firms are primarily interested in reducing costs and
getting new products to market in a rapidly changing technological
environment.
94 A primary means to do so is to reduce pre-marketing regulatory
requirements. The 1997 MRA annexes for telecommunications equipment and
electromagnetic compatibility facilitated advancement of businesses’ regulatory
objectives. Many telecommunications firms continue to hope that the relevant
U.S. agency, OSHA,
95 might relax its pre-market controls of electrical safety
equipment by adopting a system of self-certification used in the EC since
1973.
96
As for Europe, U.S. firms hope to use transatlantic proposals for
regulatory cooperation to change EC and member state legislative and
regulatory procedures. In this case, firms would prefer that Europe adopt more
of a U.S. procedural model, as set forth in U.S. administrative law.
97 As TABD
argues, “A key element for further discussion between business and
governments... is how to ensure transparency in the regulatory process... The
rulemaking and implementation process must be open thereby permitting
industry to participate meaningfully in the regulatory process.”
98 TABD urges,
in particular, “greater use of ‘impact assessment’ on regulations...(which) should
include estimating the costs and benefits of regulation as well as any regulatory
alternatives.”
99 The United States, in this case, has taken up TABD’s proposals
in the negotiation of a U.S. - EC agreement on regulatory cooperation and
transparency. In a 2001 draft, the United States proposed addressing
“transparency” in regulatory processes through such mechanisms as “notice and
comment rulemaking procedures,” mandatory assessments of the “potential
benefits, costs and other impacts for all parties, domestic and non-domestic,”
“public explanations... for the proposal and the alternatives,” and “access to
documents containing supporting research, data and analysis.”
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B. The 1997 MRA in the Context of Global Business Strategies.
Businesses also view transatlantic mutual recognition agreements in a global
context. Firms, together with some government representatives, hope that
transatlantic arrangements may be a stepping stone for reaching mutual
recognition agreements with third countries, thereby offering increased access to
lucrative Asian and South American markets. The WTO Agreement on
Technical Barriers to Trade and the General Agreement on Trade in Services
explicitly encourage and lend legal support to the expansion of transatlantic
MRAs.
101 Under WTO rules, countries that do not “give mutual satisfaction” to
third countries offering “equivalent” procedures or standards are subject to
WTO anti-discrimination claims under WTO most-favored nations clauses.
102
While the prospect of these claims remains relatively remote, business
organizations, such as the TABD, can use the WTO agreements as additional
leverage.
Much more importantly than potential legal claims, each new mutual
recognition agreement places pressure on third countries to enter into
negotiations so that their firms are not disadvantaged–what Kalypso Nicolaidis
refers to as a potential “contagion effect.”
103 Transatlantic and third country
negotiations thereby have reciprocal effects. Each MRA provides leverage to
domestic firms to demand new MRAs (with transatlantic or third country
counterparts, as the case may be) to equalize market access. The
telecommunications industry has sought MRAs for other lucrative markets in
Asia and Latin America, which U.S. and EC authorities respectively have signed
through APEC and CITEL.
104 The EC has signed MRAs with Australia, Canada,
Israel, Japan and New Zealand, in addition to those signed with the United
States. The transatlantic MRA can, in this way, be seen as a step for the
extension of MRAs globally, helping ensure that not only transatlantic markets,
but also other foreign markets, will remain open to foreign competition.
The telecommunications industry, in particular, has promoted in global
regulatory change toward the EC’s self-certification model. If the industry could
spur regulatory change in the United States, it might use the transatlantic MRA
as a catalyst for this global strategy.
105 The EC and United States are, in fact, in
the process of implementing or negotiating a number of MRAs elsewhere in the
world.
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C. The Challenge of Implementation: Reconciling Regulatory Systems and
Cultures.
The significant institutional asymmetries between the United States’ and EC’s
respective regulatory systems and cultures creates a major challenge for
transatlantic regulatory cooperation and the implementation of transatlantic
mutual recognition agreements. Where regulators adopt similar regulatory
structures and systems, and enact similar substantive standards, they more easily
understand and accept each other’s regulatory determinations. Regulatory
symmetry facilitates regulatory trust and confidence, enabling regulatory
cooperation to occur. For example, U.S. and EC regulatory authorities each have
supported a more decentralized process for pre-marketing approvals of
telecommunications equipment, which explains the relative ease of this annex’s
implementation.
Although the U.S. system is often characterized as fragmented and
decentralized, its actual nature varies by sector. At times, the U.S. system is
relatively highly centralized, as when Congress delegates regulatory authority to
an independent federal regulatory body, such as the FDA.
107 At other times, the
U.S. system is more fragmented, with regulation consisting of a patchwork of
federal, state, and private voluntary standards with no overarching framework,
as in the case of data privacy protection.
108 Significant for transatlantic mutual
recognition agreements, U.S. private standard-setting bodies remain highly
fragmented, since the American National Standards Institute (ANSI), which is
the closest analogue to a U.S. national standards body, does not serve as an
administrator or coordinator of private standard-setting.
109
While some commentators maintain that the United States grants private
actors relatively more flexibility than in Europe,
110 this stereotype is belied in
practice by a number of the sectors covered by the 1997 transatlantic MRA. For
example, the FCC certified all telecommunications equipment until the
negotiation of the transatlantic mutual recognition agreement, at which time it
adopted a more decentralized EC model. The U.S. Occupational Health and
Safety Administration requires OSHA-accredited laboratories to certify all
electrical safety equipment used in the workplace, whereas the EC has permitted
manufacturers to self-certify the equipment’s conformity with EC requirements
since 1973. The U.S. Food and Drug Administration continues to certify most
medical devices,
111 whereas EC authorities have permitted testing by private
notified bodies since (1994).22
U.S. and EC regulators work in different regulatory cultures, ones which (in the
case of the MRA) makes EC institutional adaptation easier. EC and European
national regulators operate under the dual mission of ensuring free trade within
the internal market, on the one hand, while ensuring public safety through high
product and process standards, on the other. They thus are quite accustomed to
interacting with foreign regulators and testing bodies on an on-going basis. In
consequence, the Commission’s DG Enterprise and DG Trade units rarely
tousled when negotiating and implementing the 1997 Mutual Recognition
Agreement. In contrast, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration traditionally has
defined its role solely as that of protecting U.S. public health, and has not
operated under a dual mission of also facilitating market exchange. Although
FDA officials participate in the International Conference on Harmonization and
although Congress expanded the FDA’s mission in 1998 to include trade
facilitation,
112 FDA authorities have developed U.S. standards and procedures
over time in relative isolation from other regulators. FDA officials often
consider their practices as superior, constituting what the FDA’s General
Counsel has characterized as “the gold standard.”
113 Because the FDA is an
independent regulatory authority anxious to protect its regulatory autonomy,
U.S. trade and commerce authorities encounter more difficulties in negotiating
bilateral agreements concerning areas within the FDA’s jurisdiction. Because of
OSHA’s and FDA’s wariness of relinquishing regulatory controls, the U.S. and
EC have so far been unable to implement the MRAs for electrical safety
equipment, medical devices and pharmaceutical good manufacturing practices.
Implementation of transatlantic MRAs also has been much easier for the
EC, because EC regulatory authorities only have to adapt to one new regulatory
system (the United States’) that is overseen in one language (English), whereas
U.S. authorities must adapt to fifteen different regulatory structures operating in
eleven different languages under the EC’s umbrella. EC regulatory authorities
already are accustomed to dealing with other national regulators in the context
of the EC’s single market. Simply as regards language, U.S. certification bodies
submit their applications and testing report in English, a language with which
EC and member state regulators are well-accustomed.
114 Expansion of the EC
system to include the United States is a less significant change. The EC’s
implementation of the recreational craft annex thus has been relatively simpler




OSHA, for example, has found implementation of the MRA to be a
“headache”
116 as it believes that it is being pressed to accept, without significant23
review, applications forwarded to it by fifteen different member state authorities,
all or part of which may be in any one of the EC’s eleven official languages. To
ensure its regulatory mission, OSHA has insisted that it control the designation
of European Conformity Assessment Bodies under the electrical safety
equipment annex, rather than relying on European member state designations.
OSHA has rejected a number of Conformity Assessment Bodies designated by
member state authorities on different grounds, including on account of the
language of the submission and the submission’s incompleteness.
117 In addition,
OSHA has insisted that it conduct on-site reviews of these bodies. Finally,
OSHA began charging an application fee in October 2000 because of the burden
of the application process, which further raised tensions with European
regulatory authorities. The Commission maintains that OSHA’s assertion of
control over the designation of European Conformity Assessment Bodies is in
violation of the agreement’s letter and spirit.
118
The tensions between OSHA and the Commission’s enterprise
directorate-general stem, in large part, from differences in U.S. and EC
regulatory structure and culture in this specific area. Since the EC’s 1973
Council Directive on electrical safety equipment, EC member states permit
manufacturers to self-certify their compliance with EC electrical safety
requirements, subject to post-marketing member state surveillance and
controls.
119 The member states have agreed on the harmonization of
approximately 600 standards for electrical safety equipment, which largely
transpose international standards.
120 In contrast, all electrical safety equipment
that may be used in the workplace in the United States must be approved by a
laboratory recognized and overseen by OSHA.
121
From the perspective of European regulators, the United States lacks the
political will to provide for mutual recognition in this annex. As one
Commission official states, “OSHA never wanted this annex and is not
committed to it.”
122 OSHA officials indirectly concur, arguing that this annex
was included as a “political gesture” to the Europeans and the
telecommunications industry.”
123 U.S. and EC regulatory authorities are now
skeptical of the benefits of the electrical safety MRA. OSHA maintains that it
already certifies foreign laboratories so that there is no need for an MRA. EC
officials concur that if OSHA refuses to trust EC designating authorities, the
MRA becomes superfluous. According to one Commission official, this MRA
annex has been “counterproductive” for overall efforts at U.S. - EC regulatory
cooperation. Another Commission official claims that the EC may exercise its




Similarly, implementation of even a relatively limited MRA program for
medical devices has encountered serious obstacles. The primary difficulty lies in
the wariness of the FDA, stemmed in large part by the very different nature of
the U.S. and EC regulatory systems. The European regulatory system for
medical devices is much more decentralized under the EC’s “new” and “global”
approaches. The relevant EC directives
125 only sets forth “essential
requirements” that, in turn, are supplemented by voluntary standards set by
standard-setting bodies. These standards bodies have agreed to a considerable
number of harmonized standards, which facilitates the tasks of both regulators
and testing laboratories. Accredited laboratories (“notified bodies”) test and
certify the products, and once certified, the products are only subject to post-
market surveillance controls. Moreover, firms are offered a choice of how to
meet the essential requirements, which choice varies depending on the product
and its risk.
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In contrast, the U.S. system is more heavily regulated, as the FDA often
requires (depending on the product) both quality systems evaluations (which it
terms “surveillance/post-market and initial/pre-approval inspection reports”) and
pre-market product evaluation reports (which it calls “510(k) reports”).
127
Although the FDA is now working with private laboratories, its program is still
in a pilot stage. Moreover, under the FDA’s new program, FDA retains ultimate
authority whether or not to accept laboratory reports or to require further
information or testing, so that reliance on private laboratory certification (unlike
FDA certification) is not automatic.
The FDA shows even more reticence concerning the annex for
pharmaceutical good manufacturing practices. Because pharmaceutical products
most directly bear on the FDA’s mission of protecting U.S. public health, the
FDA refuses to be forced to recognize member state equivalency until it is fully
satisfied. In the words of one FDA official, FDA has “refused to compromise its
mission of protecting public health for balance of trade purposes.”
128 Because of
the FDA’s independence, there is little that the U.S. administration can do.
Business has not been able to prevail over the FDA because the FDA also has
allies among U.S. consumer advocates and Republican and Democratic
Congressional representatives.
129 European representatives counter that the
United States and its regulatory agencies must demonstrate their commitment to
the 1997 MRA, and ultimately, show greater trust in the EC system, if
transatlantic mutual recognition agreements are to work.25
D. The Unexpected Challenge of Market Barriers to Implementation.
Transatlantic trade officials and businesses that first touted the benefits of U.S.-
EC mutual recognition arrangements now realize their underestimation of the
difficulties of implementation. These constraints involve not just regulators and
regulatory cultures, but market forces as well. The market has not reacted
favorably to the recognition of new Conformity Assessment Bodies under the
1997 MRA.
130 From the perspective of manufacturers, they typically develop
long-term working relationships with certifying laboratories, which constitute a
form of cost-effective firm-laboratory partnership. Because manufacturers invest
in educating these laboratories about their products and manufacturing
processes, and the relationship of these products and processes to applicable
regulatory requirements, the cost of changing laboratories may be significant.
Moreover, a laboratory’s mark itself may be important in some markets, so that
firms may continue obtaining formal certification from EC notified bodies for
the EC market and U.S. laboratories for the United States. As a result, most
firms may continue using the same laboratories even though these laboratories
cannot directly certify products as Conformity Assessment Bodies, but must
work through sub-contracting arrangements with accredited laboratories on the
other side of the Atlantic.
131
As for laboratories, they will not invest in the accreditation procedures
required to become a Conformity Assessment Body if they fear that the benefits
are limited or too uncertain. Accreditation costs can be substantial, involving
seminars, workshops, training programs, audits and joint inspections with
authorities across the Atlantic. While twelve European notified bodies initially
applied to be recognized as Conformity Assessment Bodies under the medical
device annex, two subsequently withdrew on account of costs.
132 As a result,
both manufacturing firms and private laboratories have become, in the words of
one Commission official “a bit cool on the MRA.”
133 This industry reaction, in
turn, suits those regulators who were not enthusiastic about the MRA in the first
place. The MRA’s success, in consequence, may require considerable market
promotion, including through government subsidies and promotional programs.
As Commission representatives assert, “the MRA should contain sufficient
commercial incentives for potential CABs (Conformity Assessment Bodies) and
industry to show interest. Use of the MRA cannot be imposed.”
134 The
Transatlantic Business Dialogue supports such promotional efforts.
135
Some domestic firms, however, also benefit from domestic regulatory
barriers to their transatlantic competitors. When there is no domestic
constituency actively pressing for domestic regulatory change in a specific
sector, implementation of the MRA faces greater hurdles. For example, there is26
no dominant U.S. constituency pressing for implementation of the electrical
safety MRA. As a Commission official points out, this is not a “balanced”
MRA, since U.S.-based firms do not require conformity assessment to sell
electrical safety equipment in the EC market. In addition, most U.S. producers
allegedly encounter relatively less difficulty with OSHA’s program for their
sales on the U.S. market, and thus may gain an advantage vis-a-vis European
competitors because of their experience with OSHA-certified laboratories.
Finally, laboratories already certified by OSHA have a relatively protected
market and do not desire competition from laboratories newly certified by
European authorities. Thus, there is little U.S. constituent pressure on OSHA to
concede to the EC and recognize laboratories designated by EC member state
authorities. Rather, the best hope for European firms may be that the change in
U.S. administration could lead to deregulation of OSHA’s pre-market approval
process by permitting manufacturer self-certification. If this occurs, however,
the electrical safety annex’s provision of mutual recognition of testing bodies
would have served little purpose other than (possibly) to help foment domestic
regulatory change.
V. U.S. - EC UNDERSTANDING ON PRINCIPLES FOR DATA
PRIVACY PROTECTION: MANAGING CONFLICT AND
MAINTAINING FREE TRADE THROUGH HYBRID INSTITUTIONAL
DEVELOPMENTS A LEVERAGING UP OF STANDARDS?
In July 2000, the United States Department of Commerce and European
Commission formalized an agreement creating a set of “Safe Harbor Principles”
(the Principles) on data privacy protection, under which U.S.-based firms may
certify themselves in order to avoid European restrictions on data transfers to the
United States.
136 The Principles constitute a unique development in the
governance of U.S. - EC economic relations. To some, they represent the EC’s
exercise of coercive market power in an extraterritorial fashion in an attempt to
leverage up privacy standards within the United States.
137 To others, they
represent a capitulation by EC trade bureaucrats to U.S. trading concerns
through a weak agreement filled with loopholes.
138 And finally, to some,
including this author, they represent a compromise through new institutional
development pursuant to which free transatlantic information flows may be
preserved while satisfying legitimate EC concerns about the use of personal
information concerning EC residents in a technology-intensive, interdependent
globalizing economy.
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Unlike the mutual recognition agreements assessed above, the Safe
Harbor Principles constitute a form of de facto harmonization of social
standards. The Principles go beyond current regulatory requirements in the27
United States, and thereby constitute a regulatory floor with which trading firms
must comply if they wish to receive data from Europe without threat of
challenge. This harmonization, however, is designed to affect only trading firms,
and otherwise to create no legal obligations within the United States. The United
States and EC may thereby claim that they formally retain autonomy to enact
whatever privacy legislation they deem appropriate. However, any firm which
engages in cross-border exchange is subject to pressure to abide by the
Principles. In this way, Europe’s regulatory approach may have spillover effects
within the United States, leading to some convergence in data privacy practices,
despite differing U.S. and EC regulatory systems.
Although the extent of the Safe Harbor Principles’ implementation
remains an open question, the U.S. - EC dispute and efforts at cooperation
demonstrate the inherent interrelation between social regulation and open trade
policies where regulation (or the lack thereof) has external effects. Alleged U.S.
under-regulation can jeopardize the privacy interests of EC residents. Alleged
EC over-regulation can limit the commercial operations of U.S. enterprises. In
an interdependent transatlantic economy, U.S. and EC authorities attempt to
manage the ensuing conflicts of norms and mesh, where possible, their divergent
regulatory systems.
A. Pooled Sovereignty: The EC’s Market Clout in an Interdependent
Transatlantic Economy.
The U.S. - EC agreement was spurred by the creation of the EC single market,
on the one hand, and the interdependent nature of the U.S. and European
economies, on the other. The creation of the single market led to the EC’s
regulation of data privacy in the first place. Among the ironies inherent in the
U.S. - EC dispute is that the original purpose of the EC’s data privacy directive
was not just to increase data privacy protection within the European
Community. It was also to ensure the uninhibited flow of data within the EC
from the threat of unilateral restrictions by individual EC member states on
account of their differing data privacy protection regimes.
140 The interlinked
nature of social protection and liberalized trade in a single European market
gave rise to the Directive.
Similarly, data privacy protection became a transatlantic issue because of
the growing interdependence of the U.S. and European economies and the rising
importance of information technology. U.S. affiliates in Europe produce over a
trillion dollars of goods and services annually, constituting “over half of all the
foreign production of U.S. companies.”
141 These companies depend on
information flows, not only with third party suppliers, customers, consultants,28
marketers and other service providers, but also internally, within their complex
networks of affiliates, joint ventures and partnerships.
The U.S - EC dispute over the adequacy of U.S. data privacy protection
affects U.S. privacy policies and practices because the EC exercises political and
market power. In a globalizing marketplace, the EC’s single market initiative
has reinforced the European Commission’s position as a global actor.
142 The
EC’s huge internal market enables the Commission to exercise considerable
political clout in the negotiation of international and transatlantic rules,
including harmonized rules governing firm behavior.
The shift of European regulation to the EC level has strengthened the
EC’s ability to represent the interests of its constituents vis-a-vis the United
States. The EC member states have not simply “lost” sovereignty in working
through centralized EC authorities. They have reallocated it in a manner which
effectively enhances their negotiating authority (and in that way their autonomy)
vis-a-vis the United States.
143 In pooling their sovereignty, EC member states
now speak with a more powerful voice transatlantically. The timing of the
United States’ reaction to the threat of bans on data transfers from Europe
demonstrates this. It was not until the EC’s privacy directive went into effect
that U.S. authorities drafted Safe Harbor Principles and increased pressure on
companies to raise their internal privacy standards. When the threat moved to
the EC level, the United States took the threat more seriously.
B. Overview of The EC Privacy Directive’s Internal Requirements: Ex
Ante and Ex Poste Controls.
On October 24, 1998, Directive 95/46/EC on the Protection of Individuals with
Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and the Free Movement of such
Data
144 became effective. The EC, through its Directive, takes primarily a
regulatory approach to data privacy protection, as opposed to private ordering
through market processes. The Directive is noteworthy for its broad scope of
coverage. Except for public security, criminal law and related exceptions, it
covers all processing of all personal data by whatever means, and is not limited
to action by government, business sector or field of use (arts. 2-3). The Directive
prohibits data controllers from processing information unless the individual
“unambiguously” consents to the processing and that consent is informed (arts.
7, 8, 10, 14). Information subject to the most stringent controls includes
“personal data revealing racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or
philosophical beliefs, trade-union membership, and the processing of data
concerning health or sex life” (art. 8).29
The Directive provides multiple means for enforcement. It requires
member states to grant individuals a permanent right of access to obtain copies
of the data about them and have it corrected or its use enjoined (arts. 12, 28). It
obliges member states to provide a judicial remedy for infringements of data
privacy rights, including the right to receive damages (arts. 22-24). To support
effective enforcement, each member state must designate an independent public
authority “responsible for monitoring the application within its territory” of the
Directive’s provisions (art. 28). These supervisory authorities are to be granted
significant powers, including the power to investigate processing operations, to
deliver “opinions before processing operations are carried out,” to order “the
blocking, erasure or destruction of data,” to impose “a temporary or definitive
ban on processing,” and “to engage in legal proceedings” against violators of the
rights guaranteed by the Directive (arts. 18, 28).
C. Overview of U.S. Data Privacy Protection vis-a-vis the Directive’s
Criteria.
In contrast to the EC, the United States has stressed “self-regulation” by the
private sector backed by regulation which tends to be sector-specific and less
stringent. Congress’ targeting of specific sectors and concerns is reflected in the
following statutory titles: The Driver’s Privacy Protection Act of 1994, the
Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988, The Electronic Communications Privacy
Act of 1986, the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, and The Fair Credit
Reporting Act of 1971.
145 Overall, the U.S. approach is fragmented, involving
standard-setting and enforcement by a wide variety of actors, including federal
and state legislatures, agencies and courts, industry associations, individual
companies and market forces.
146 To a certain extent, the United States’ handling
of data privacy issues reflects Americans’ traditional distrust of a centralized
government.
147 U.S. legislation provides citizens with significantly greater
protection against the collection and use of personal information by government,
in particular the federal government, than by the private sector.
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Nonetheless, demands for privacy legislation covering the private sector
within the United States have increased. In the fall of 1998, the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) successfully lobbied for greater online data privacy
protection for children. See  Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681 Title XIII
(1998). In May 2000, a divided FTC, by a 3-2 vote, called for Congress to enact
on-line privacy protection for all persons within the United States. Federal Trade
Commission,  Privacy Online: Fair Information Practices in the Electronic
Marketplace: A Report to Congress, May 2000. With the change in the
administration, the FTC has backed away from recommending legislation. The
Bush administration nonetheless has implemented new medical privacy rules30
adopted by the Department of Health and Human Services during the Clinton
administration (although it did note that they could be revised or clarified to
account for industry concerns). See Robert Pear, Bush Accepts Rules to Guard
Privacy of Medical Records, NYT (April 13, 2001). Moreover, numerous
privacy bills are pending in Congress.
D. The Directive’s Extraterritorial Impact: Ban on Data Transfers to
Countries Lacking Adequate Privacy Protection.
Article 25 of the Directive provides that member states shall prohibit all data
transfers to a third country if the Commission finds that the country does not
ensure “an adequate level of protection” of data privacy. Pursuant to article 29
of the Directive, an EC Working Party prepared a series of documents that
identified core principles under which the adequacy of a country’s protections
should be gauged.
149 These principles are in line with the EC’s internal
requirements and include the following: processing must be limited to a specific
purpose made known to the concerned individual, together with other
information to ensure fair processing; the individual must have access to the data
and the right to object to its processing; the individual must have procedural
mechanisms available to effectively enforce the protections.
Since it appeared that the United States might not provide for “adequate”
data privacy protection under the Directive’s criteria, U.S. and EC authorities
engaged in intensive negotiations to avoid a ban on data flows to the United
States, culminating in their agreement on Safe Harbor Principles. The
Commission refrained from finding that the United States, as a whole,
inadequately ensures data privacy protection while the parties negotiated the
content of the Principles. Once signed, the member states formally recognized
that U.S. firms’ adherence to these Principles would be sufficient to protect them
from member state challenge. Member state authorities, however, may still
challenge transfers to firms that do not adopt and comply with the Principles.
Privacy rights associations can trigger these proceedings by filing claims with
supervisory authorities.
150 Even before implementation of the Directive, data
transfers to the United States were barred by British, French, German and
Swedish courts and administrative authorities.
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E. The Safe Harbor Principles.
The U.S. Department of Commerce issued its first draft “Safe Harbor
Principles” in November 1998, within a month of the Directive becoming
effective. These were opened for comments within the United States and
negotiated for almost twenty months with the Commission before they were31
finalized and approved by the EC.
152 The guidelines set forth seven core data
privacy principles for industry to follow. Because the EC formally
acknowledged the Principles as “adequate” under the Directive’s criteria, the
Principles provide U.S. businesses with a “safe harbor.” The seven Principles
are:
(i)  “Notice”: An organization must provide “clear and conspicuous” notice to
individuals “about the purposes for which it collects and uses information
about them, how to contact the organization with... complaints, the types
of third parties to which it discloses the information, and the... means...
for limiting its use and disclosure”;
(ii)  “Choice”: An organization must provide individuals with a “clear and
conspicuous” choice to “opt out” of how their personal information may
be used and to whom it may be disclosed; “for sensitive information (i.e,
personal information specifying medical or health conditions, racial or
ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, trade
union membership or information specifying the sex life of the
individual), they must be given affirmative or explicit (opt in) choice if
the information is to be disclosed to a third party or used for a purpose
other than those for which it was originally collected or substantively
authorized...”;
(iii)  “Onward Transfer”: To disclose information to a third party, an
organization must apply the “Notice and Choice principles”;
(iv)  “Security”: Organizations must take reasonable measures to protect
information from disclosure, misuse, alteration or loss;
(v)  “Data Integrity”: Organizations “may not process personal information in
a way that is incompatible with the purposes for which it has been
collected or subsequently authorized,” and “take reasonable steps to
ensure that data is... accurate, complete and current”;
(vi)  “Access”: An organization must grant individuals access to personal
information held about them and the opportunity to have it corrected,
except where the burden would be disproportionate to the privacy risks in
the case in question;
(vii)  “Enforcement”: There must be “mechanisms for assuring compliance”
and “consequences” for non-compliance, which must include “readily
available and affordable independent recourse mechanisms” and
“sanctions (that) must be sufficiently rigorous to ensure compliance.”32
The U.S. Department of Commerce and Commission supplemented the
Principles with a document entitled “Frequently Asked Questions” (FAQs)
designed to guide firms and authorities in the Principles’ application. Many of
the FAQs specify the scope of exceptions, thereby providing some leeway to
U.S. firms. Nonetheless, many firms find that the Principles require significant
internal company adaptations.
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Companies join the Safe Harbor program by annually certifying to the
U.S. Department of Commerce that they will comply with the Principles. The
Department of Commerce then places the company’s name on its web site list of
certifying firms.
154 The firms’ primary benefit from certifying is that EC
member states may not challenge them under member state law or otherwise
condition any data transfers to them. Moreover, U.S. law applies to the
Principles’ interpretation, and U.S. courts and administrative bodies hear all
claims (although European courts and administrative bodies may still challenge
the online collection of information from European residents by U.S.-based
firms).
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Self-regulatory organizations (such as BBB Online and TRUSTe,
discussed below), backed by the U.S. Federal Trade Commission, offer the
primary means for the Principles’ enforcement. In this way, the Principles’
application resembles the EC’s new and global approaches to internal market
harmonization. As under the new approach, the Safe Harbor Principles set forth
“essential requirements” that firms must meet. As under the global approach,
firms self-certify their adherence, which certification is backed first by audits
from self-regulatory organizations, and then (ultimately) by the authority of the
state. If a company adopts the safe harbor principles and fails to comply with
them, it subjects itself to challenge by the FTC for “using unfair or deceptive
acts or practices in or affecting commerce.”
156 In a letter to the Commission date
July 14, 2000, the FTC committed itself to “give priority to referrals of non-
compliance with self-regulatory guidelines... (and) safe harbor principles”
respectively referred to it from certifying organizations and EC member state
authorities. As documented in this letter, the FTC has already brought
enforcement actions against firms for failure to comply with their posted privacy
policies.
157 In this backhanded way, the Directive informally shapes U.S. data
privacy requirements, potentially becoming a baseline standard.
158 Yet, it does
so in a relatively flexible manner that respects U.S. legal sovereignty and use of
private oversight bodies.33
F. Other Means to Comply with the Directive.
The Safe Harbor Principles should not be viewed in isolation, since the
Directive provides other ways to comply with it, in particular through obtaining
“unambiguous” consent from the “data subject” in Europe (art 7) and the
signature of a “model contract” with data privacy authorities in member states
(Article 26). In January 2002, the Commission approved standard contract
clauses covering privacy protection that can be applied to all data transfers from
the EC, regardless of a firm’s adherence to the Safe Harbor Principles.
159 U.S.
financial services firms were particularly interested in the content of this model
contract since they currently are ineligible for certification under the Safe
Harbor Principles because no federal authority (such as the FTC) has
competence to enforce them.
160 When a draft model contract went beyond Safe
Harbor requirements, the financial services industry reacted vehemently,
pressuring the Treasury and Commerce Departments to send a joint letter to the
Commission in protest, albeit to no avail.
161 Firms also can sign ad hoc contracts
with individual member state data privacy authorities.
162 In addition, firms can
sign contracts with affiliates when transferring personal information, such as
information contained in personnel files.
G. Implementation
The Safe Harbor Principles are still at an inchoate stage so that it remains too
early to assess their impact. Some commentators questioned the effectiveness of
the Principles given that only a few U.S. companies initially signed them.
However, as practitioners point out, companies will not certify their procedures
until their operations are in compliance. For large companies, this can involve
considerable re-engineering of their information systems, creation of new
internal policies, and training of personnel. Moreover, many companies waited
to see the content of the Commission’s “model contract,” which turned out to be
more stringent than the Safe Harbor Principles themselves. Finally, U.S. and EC
officials had agreed on an implementation period during which firms would not
be challenged, which period would be “reviewed in mid 2001."
163 As the review
deadline approached, more companies certified themselves, or publicly
announced their intention to do so.
164 Although some companies initially
hesitated certifying under the Safe Harbor Principles in order to avoid being
subject to FTC challenge within the United States, most large companies
receiving data from Europe will likely not reason in this manner. They would
prefer to be in legal compliance with EC rules on both reputational and legal
grounds, and the Safe Harbor Principles are the easiest way to proceed.34
Companies engaged in transatlantic business operate in the shadow of the
Directive’s potential enforcement. As noted above, and as I have argued
elsewhere, the EC Directive and Safe Harbor Principles contribute to a gradual
convergence in data privacy practices. Data privacy regulation in Europe has
informed not only the tenor and context of debates in the United States; it has
shaped interest groups’ appreciation of their options. Under the Directive, U.S.
businesses face potential litigation before European courts and administrative
bodies unless they adhere to the Safe Harbor Principles. Playing off the U.S. -
EC regulatory conflict and its media coverage, privacy advocates have jacked up
pressure on U.S. federal and state politicians, regulatory authorities and
businesses. Even though privacy advocates have criticized the Safe Harbor
Principles, privacy advocates will use them as part of their larger strategies. The
context in which U.S. domestic debates over data privacy protection take place
has been altered.
The Directive, in particular, has increased the demand for legal,
consulting and other privacy services within the United States. The Center for
Social and Legal Research, “a privacy think tank” based in Hackensack, New
Jersey, works with multinational companies in drafting codes of conduct
incorporating the Directive’s requirements.
165 The Better Business Bureau
OnLine created a privacy seal program which incorporates the Safe Harbor
Principles, and was revised to track “safe harbor” negotiations.
166 The Electronic
Frontier Foundation, a San Francisco-based public interest organization, has
associated with information technology companies to launch a program named
TRUSTe to rate the privacy protection of Internet sites, which program is
certified under Safe Harbor.
167 Accountants, through their national organization,
the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA), created an
analogous program entitled CPA WebTrust, under which they will evaluate web
sites, conduct audits of firm’s privacy practices and recertify participating
firms.
168 As smaller companies find these certification programs costly, trade
associations such as the Direct Marketing Association designed their own
enforcement programs for their members to comply with Safe Harbor
requirements.
169 Legislation, in this case foreign legislation, has helped raise the
standards to be certified and spurred more companies to use seal programs with
oversight and sanctioning mechanisms.
The Directive also has spurred the creation of a new corporate position–
the chief data privacy officer in companies’ human resources divisions. These
company employees attend conferences on the Directive and U.S. privacy
legislation,
170 write memoranda on privacy issues that they distribute within
firms, and generally increase firm awareness of privacy issues. In formulating
and overseeing the implementation of company policies, they foster company35
compliance with applicable legal requirements. Finally, outside law firms
increasingly provide advice to firms regarding the Directive and the Safe Harbor
Principles, thereby again promoting adaptation of U.S. business practice. This
conjunction of lawyer, consultant and “privacy officer” advice, rendered in the
context of the Safe Harbor Principles, can lead to convergence of privacy
policies over time, reducing the chance of a major transatlantic trade dispute
over data privacy.
H. The Shadow of WTO Rules.
In an attempt to ward off EC action, U.S. officials implicitly threatened to
challenge any ban imposed by the EC before the WTO’s Dispute Settlement
Body.
171 However, provided that the EC does not apply the Directive in a
manner that discriminates against the United States, it arguably is in compliance
with WTO rules.
172 First, on its face, the Directive applies equally to EC and
foreign-owned goods and services providers, and thus should not violate
national treatment or most-favored nation clauses.
173 Second, WTO
jurisprudence supports the EC’s position.
174 The WTO Appellate Body would
likely refrain from engaging in a close balancing of trade and privacy interests,
and rather review the process by which the EC takes account of foreign privacy
protections. In compliance with the WTO Appellate Body’s approach in past
jurisprudence, the EC has studiously assessed U.S. practices affecting the
privacy of EC residents; U.S. authorities and companies have had access to EC
officials to comment on the Directive and its applications; and the EC has
engaged in prolonged, detailed discussions with U.S. representatives to examine
“adequate” (as opposed to identical) data privacy safeguards which could be
applied. Thus, in the case of the EC data privacy enforcement, WTO rules
should shield the EC from a U.S. retaliatory threat. WTO rules thereby have
reinforced pressure on the United States to negotiate a set of more stringent, data
privacy requirements in the form of the Safe Harbor Principles.
I.  Some Conclusions on Safe Harbor.
While the Safe Harbor Principles do not formally apply to purely domestic data
processing operations, U.S.-based enterprises recognize that it will be difficult
for them to use two sets of data privacy practices, one for EC residents
(providing for greater privacy protection), and one for U.S. residents (providing
for less). Business databases will often include information about EC and U.S.
residents, in which case businesses will be pushed to comply with the EC’s more
demanding requirements.
175 In addition, if businesses provide greater data
privacy protection for EC residents than for U.S. residents, they may harm their
public image. Privacy advocates have already exploited this argument,36
proclaiming that U.S. citizens should not be treated as second class citizens in
their own country.
176 This move toward convergence, in practice, should help
relieve cross-border regulatory conflicts.
Most importantly, in a world of increased economic interdependence, the
Safe Harbor Principles point to the importance of regulatory cooperation across
borders involving public and private actors. Certification groups such as BBB
OnLine meet with European data protection officials so that they become
comfortable in the workings of an alternative U.S. approach. These private
groups also negotiate contracts for joint seal programs in other jurisdictions,
such as that concluded in 2001 between BBB OnLine and a Japanese
counterpart.
177 In this way, on-line businesses can meet criteria in multiple
jurisdictions without the need for drawn-out treaty negotiations. Government
officials, including in Europe, realize that they do not have the resources to
enforce the Directive’s provisions solely on their own, and thus rely on public-
private networks in an attempt to ensure better global practices affecting EC
constituents. The regulation of data privacy in a global economy will require the
meshing of different regulatory systems and a commitment from the various
actors to sustained interaction to ensure trust and confidence in each other’s
efforts.
From a practical standpoint, the separate goals of protecting individual
privacy, on the one hand, while ensuring trade liberalization, on the other, are
inseparable. Regulation in a jurisdiction with less stringent data privacy controls
has significant externalities, thereby affecting residents in other jurisdictions.
The Safe Harbor Principles are an example of an instrument for reconciling
these regulatory concerns with the goals of liberalized trade. They represent a
form of compromise that recognizes different institutional approaches and social
values, yet nonetheless sets baseline rules where domestic values are affected by
trade. To make them work, however, will require sustained, cross-border
cooperation. These new experiments in governance are a much preferred way to
proceed than through litigation before a supranational court, such as the WTO’s
Dispute Settlement Body. New institutional development requires creative
problem-solving and political will. The Safe Harbor Principles are an example
of what–potentially–can be accomplished.37
VI. CONCLUSIONS: THE PROSPECTS AND LIMITS OF U.S. - EC
BILATERAL REGULATORY COOPERATION THROUGH MUTUAL
RECOGNITION AGREEMENTS: MOVING TOWARD AN EC
SYSTEM?
A. Reasons for Enhanced Bilateral Regulatory Cooperation.
Despite the significant difficulties of implementing the various U.S. - EC
bilateral agreements, they have also created frameworks for interaction among
regulatory officials who are responsible for protecting the health and safety of
residents in an array of areas. Even if these transatlantic regulatory interactions
result in tensions, blockages and obstacles, the concerned regulatory authorities
also become more educated about each other’s systems and are simultaneously
initiating and pursuing various informal parallel programs which receive less
attention than the conflicts, but may be more important in the long-term.
Sustained regulatory encounters promoted by the various bilateral agreements
ultimately are much more important than abstract undertakings to engage in
regulatory cooperation.
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This regulatory interaction can lead to more protective social regulation
and greater trade facilitation, both to consumers’ benefit. First, regulatory
exchange can spur improved social regulation, as authorities compare
experiences and learn from each other’s best practices. FDA and member state
regulatory officials, for example, meet to study their different evaluations of
new products and the reasons why one authority may grant and the other
withhold approval. They complement their reviews of market approvals with
new joint alert and safeguard systems to more rapidly notify each other of risks
that they encounter, and better coordinate procedures to address them.
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Through these information exchanges, regulatory officials learn to build on each
other’s separate experiences, avoiding duplicative efforts so that they can target
resources for other challenges.
Second, regulatory exchange can lead to harmonized standards and
procedures, which can help facilitate and spur further regulatory cooperation
because officials more easily understand each other’s systems and activities. In
addition, harmonized standards can facilitate trade and competition by reducing
production costs, since firms no longer need different product lines and product
evaluation controls for multiple jurisdictions. For example, increased interaction
between the FDA and European regulators may facilitate transatlantic and
international harmonization through the Global Harmonization Task Force.
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These harmonization efforts reciprocally could facilitate implementation of the
medical devices MRA by easing the FDA’s review of European products and38
procedures.
181 Individuals, in turn, could have more rapid access to new
products and greater product choice at lower prices.
Harmonization, of course, is not an end in itself, and diversity is also a
core value.
182 Regulatory diversity can reflect differences in constituent values,
environmental conditions and other contexts. Nonetheless, in an increasingly
interdependent transatlantic economy in which choices in one jurisdiction may
have significant impacts on constituents in others, regulatory decisions are more
informed – and more inclusive – when made in the context of sustained
regulatory exchange. Again, the central normative goal of transgovernmental
regulatory cooperative efforts is to create frameworks that conduce national
regulators to reflexively take into account the impact of their actions on affected,
but otherwise unrepresented, foreign constituents, while remaining deferential to
disparate national values and priorities.
Third, the MRA could save firms the costs of multiple inspections. For
example, EC pharmaceutical manufacturers exporting to the United States
currently are inspected for GMP compliance by both member state and FDA
officials. These dual inspections may take up to (six weeks). Similarly, U.S.
pharmaceutical manufacturers exporting to the EC must have each batch/lot of
their products tested and certified by an EC importer in accordance with
specifications and controls set forth in EC directives. The EC importer also must
be a licensed pharmaceutical manufacturer subject to GMP reviews by the
member state authority. For certain new products, European member state
authorities sometimes conduct inspections at manufacturers’ facilities within the
United States.
183 For U.S. manufacturers, the MRA would eliminate the
additional costs of these importer batch/lot tests, certifications and inspections.
Again, reducing redundant product inspections permits products to get to market
faster at a lower price.
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Fourth, in an age of limited government resources for the oversight of
rapidly changing, expanding and interacting economies, regulators also could
save costs through enhanced cooperation with foreign regulatory officials and
decentralizing product certification systems. FDA simply does not have the
resources to adequately conduct all testing itself, especially where testing
involves significant foreign travel.
185 By permitting an “over-extended and
under-resourced” FDA
186 to outsource testing and evaluation of medical devices
to private bodies, FDA can reallocate its resources to areas of higher concern,
while retaining high product and process standards and post-market surveillance
controls. In particular, FDA officials are more concerned by medical devices
produced in jurisdictions other than Europe, so that the transatlantic MRA could
free up resources for it to address these other areas. Similarly, FDA officials39
admit that they are already unable to conduct annual pharmaceutical GMP
reviews of foreign manufacturers as they would prefer, and thus the MRA could
ensure more consistent oversight of foreign manufacturers’ practices.
B. Need for Regulatory Resources: Limits to Transatlantic Regulatory
Coordination.
Irrespective of the potential benefits to firms and regulators, and irrespective of
political pressure for regulatory adaptation, transatlantic regulatory cooperation
remains by no means a foregone conclusion. While the New Transatlantic
Agenda and Transatlantic Economic Partnership create various frameworks for
regulatory coordination, significant obstacles remain, whether on account of
institutional asymmetries, market contexts or differences in culture and values.
The challenges of implementing the 1997 Mutual Recognition Agreement and
2000 Safe Harbor Principles so demonstrate. Where existing regulatory
structures, cultures and standards mesh, then regulatory coordination becomes
easier. Both the FCC and the FTC’s have dual missions focused on assuring
consumer protection and open competition, so that they have been relatively
more open to cooperating with trade authorities under the 1997 MRA and 2000
Safe Harbor Principles. However, where regulatory agencies, such as the FDA
and OSHA, experiment for the first time with delegating functions to private
testing bodies, and, even more importantly, where these agencies are wary of
new EC-like approaches, building and retaining the requisite trust and
confidence requires considerable time and resources. Institutional learning
curves are steep. Where the issues involve differences in complex regulatory
systems, such as those covered by the 1997 medical device annex, independent
agency interests more likely prevail because political pressure from the
executive and legislative branches is more difficult to sustain.
187
As noted above, transatlantic mutual recognition agreements potentially
could save costs for regulatory agencies. However, it remains unclear whether
governments actually will save costs while ensuring consumer safety, at least in
the short term. Cross-border regulatory interaction is not free, and thus the net
benefits for regulators of the MRA remains an open question. Regulators on
both sides of the Atlantic have had to dedicate considerable resources to
implement the MRA, especially during the transition period.
188 Just to start, the
effort entails considerable up-front negotiation costs and the costs of regulators
learning and becoming comfortable with each other’s systems.
189 For example,
to implement the medical device annex, FDA has trained foreign private bodies
in its methods, conducted joint inspections, and assessed detailed dossiers. A
number of the European applicants submitted documents in a foreign language,
which FDA returned for translation. Even after translation (at the Commission’s40
expense), some applications were drafted in a broken English, again
complicating FDA’s task.
190 The FDA estimated that it already had expended
over $10 million dollars by June 2001 to implement the annex.
191 EC officials
have been even further behind schedule, citing a lack of resources. By mid-
2001, they had yet to conduct any joint tests or training of U.S. certification
bodies’ for the testing of medical devices.
192 Similarly, FDA maintains that it
does not have the resources to verify the equivalence of all fifteen member
states’ systems for implementation of the pharmaceutical GMP annex.
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C. Moving Toward an EC Model?
Overall, transatlantic institutional adaptation has been slow (and often creeping),
but where it has occurred, it has been rather unidirectional, and will likely
continue to be so.
194 Simply stated, the United States has made most of the
changes, whether through adoption of international standards that mirror EC
ones, through delegation of testing and certification responsibilities to private
laboratories (reflecting the EC’s “global approach”), or through coordination
and oversight of these laboratories under a new U.S. national program analogous
to those operating in the EC for over a decade.
195 For example, because the
United States lacked a coordinated system of accredited testing and certification
laboratories, European officials were concerned about the ability of U.S.
regulators to guarantee the competence and quality of U.S. conformity
assessment bodies. In response, the U.S. National Institute of Standards and
Technology, a division of the Department of Commerce, created a new U.S.
program (named the National Voluntary Conformity Assessment Program).
Taking from the EC model, the U.S. program aims to coordinate and oversee
U.S. conformity assessment bodies, and thereby provide greater confidence to
regulatory officials, whether domestic or foreign.
Unlike their U.S. counterparts, EC regulatory authorities have operated
for over a decade under a dual mission of ensuring public safety, on the one
hand, and ensuring free movement of goods within the EC’s single market, on
the other. They consequently are more experienced in managing the
coordination of distinct national regulatory systems than their U.S.
counterparts.
196 The EC experience thus offers a model to be considered, and
possibly adapted, for the transatlantic context, although U.S. and EC regulators
avoid formally acknowledging this on account of U.S. political sensitivities.
Yet, regardless of the model’s appropriateness, the EC exercises
significant market leverage in determining transatlantic standards and regulatory
structures required to implement mutual recognition policies on account of the
size of its single market, which is already larger than the United States’. This41
leverage will only increase as the EC potentially expands its borders to
encompass up to thirteen additional nations within the next decade. Firms
desiring access to the EC market place pressure on their national officials to
adapt their own systems to accommodate reciprocal trading arrangements. As
the EC enters into mutual recognition agreements with other OECD countries,
such as Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Switzerland and Canada, and as these
countries adapt their systems to interact with the EC model, the pressure on the
United States to adapt its own regulatory structures should augment. The same
process occurs as the EC negotiates with other countries regarding the adequacy
of their data privacy protection laws, and as these countries adapt by enacting
new legislation affecting the export of data to the United States. Consciously or
unconsciously, the EC steadily is exporting its system globally. The 1997
Mutual Recognition Agreement and the 2000 Safe Harbor Principles so attest. In
pooling their sovereignty at the EC level, European member states collectively
exercise much more leverage in transatlantic and international negotiations over
common regulatory standards and procedures.
D. Legitimacy: Ensuring Public Health and Safety while Retaining Open
Markets; the Need for Political Will and Resources to Build
Transatlantic Regulatory Trust and Confidence; The Limits of
Unfunded Mandates.
Assessing the legitimacy of enhanced bilateral cooperation raises questions of
both substance (ouputs) and procedure (inputs). From a substantive perspective,
bilateral cooperation cannot be accomplished on the cheap or it could result in
deregulatory measures with little oversight. This would lead to challenges that
the system benefits only producer, and not consumer interests, and thus that
regulatory outcomes are substantively illegitimate. From a procedural
perspective, citizens justifiably fear that they will have less control and access to
regulatory decision-making made outside of their own borders, raising issues of
procedural legitimacy.
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A number of consumer advocates, such as Public Citizen, distrust new
transatlantic mutual recognition arrangements.
198 The transatlantic push for
regulatory coordination and reform arguably has led to increased delegation of
traditional public services to private testing bodies. U.S. consumer advocates, in
particular, distrust the adoption of the EC’s decentralized approach based on
manufacturer self-certifications and certifications by private laboratories. In part,
this distrust could stem from the perception that, in the U.S. context, private
actors lack the tradition of cooperating with regulatory authorities that exists in
more corporatist, state-directed European systems.
199 There is, however, no
necessary link between private certification and increased risk to public health42
and safety, provided that these certification processes are based on high health
and safety standards and are complemented by significant regulatory oversight
and controls.
200 While there may well be a growing role for new governance
mechanisms based on private monitoring and information exchange,
201 these
mechanisms will unlikely be successful unless backed by the prospect of state
regulatory intervention.
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Building a transatlantic marketplace requires reconciliation of the twin
goals of social protection and competition through open trade. These twin goals
only can be reconciled through increased regulatory cooperation, which, in turn,
will require sustained political will, institutional adaptation, and significant
regulatory resources. EC member states have sustained such political will and
dedicated such resources over decades in order to create the single market. And
even so, they too have encountered significant setbacks and obstacles.
203 While
it is far too early to pre-judge the 1997 MRA, it nonetheless is fair to question
whether the requisite political will exists on each side of the Atlantic to ensure
that regulatory resources are made available.
Regulators engaged in this process must gain and sustain trust and
confidence in each other’s decisions, in particular in areas affecting public
health and safety where they are asked to rely on testing, certifications and
accreditations by foreign laboratories and officials. Regulatory officials on both
sides of the Atlantic complain that they simply do not have the resources to
engage in the seminars, workshops, joint testing, inspections, and information
exchange prescribed in the MRA, and necessary for its proper implementation.
The Commission’s DG Enterprise confirms that it has yet to locate the resources
to properly implement the medical devices MRA. The FDA asserts that the
MRA annexes under its responsibility constitute “unfunded mandates,” because
Congress has instructed FDA to cooperate with trade officials in the negotiation
and implementation of mutual recognition agreements, but has not provided it
with the requisite resources. FDA officials are frustrated by what they view as
“political pressure” from trade officials that “complicates our regulatory
mission.”
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This involves a curious reversal of arguments used by fiscal conservatives
within the United States. Whereas it was the Congress of the “Gingrich
Revolution” that decried “unfunded mandates” without cost-benefit analysis and
the provision of adequate federal funding to state authorities to implement
Congressional dictates, now consumer advocates and federal regulators decry
unfunded mandates for cross-border regulatory coordination. Consumer
advocacy groups go even further, arguing that businesses, not taxpayers, should
pay these costs.
205 Regardless of how the necessary regulatory resources are43
obtained, the MRA’s proper implementation requires them. Without such
resources, mutual recognition agreements could put consumer health and safety
at greater risk, calling into question the substantive legitimacy of these
arrangements. Given the United States’ traditionally more inward-looking
approach, and now that a new Republican administration is lodged in
Washington bent on tax cuts and trimming back government, whether adequate
resources will be dedicated to transatlantic regulatory cooperation remains in
doubt.
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1 The term EC is used in this Article instead of EU (or European Union) because it is EC
institutions that enter into bilateral agreements with the United States under the “first pillar”
of the Treaty of European Union (TEU) of 1992. The TEU changed the name of the European
Economic Community to the European Community to denote that the European Community
had integrated beyond purely economic matters. The TEU also created three separate pillars
of activities for the regional block. The first pillar concerned all traditional EC matters, as
expanded by the TEU to cover, in particular, European economic and monetary union. The
1997 U.S.-EC Mutual Recognition Agreement thus refers to the EC as a party, and not to the
EU. Commentators, however, often use the term EU because it is broader in scope, covering
all three pillars of activities.
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